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Using OLS and quantile regression methods and rich cross-section data sets for western and 
eastern Germany, this paper demonstrates that the impact of works council presence on labor 
productivity varies between manufacturing and services, between plants that are or are not 
covered by collective bargaining, and along the conditional distribution of labor productivity. 
No productivity effects of works councils are found for the service sector and in 
manufacturing plants not covered by collective bargaining. Besides demonstrating that it is 
important to look at evidence based on more than one data set, our empirical findings point to 
the efficacy of supplementing OLS with quantile regression estimates when investigating the 
behavior of heterogeneous plants. 
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In Germany, workers in establishments with at least five permanent employees have the right 
to elect a works council. Works councils have substantial information, consultation, and even 
codetermination rights. These rights as well as the number of councilors – both full-time and 
part-time – are increasing in establishment size (measured by the number of employees). Note 
that works councils while mandatory are not automatic and, as a practical matter, their 
presence is sporadic in smaller establishments and near universal in large plants with 500 
workers or more (for details, see Addison, Bellmann, Schnabel, and Wagner 2004). 
In theory, works councils can be expected to have both positive and negative impacts on 
various dimensions of firm performance, such as labor productivity and profitability. The 
reason resides in the two faces of works councils: On the one hand, works councils can use 
their powers to delay or modify management decisions and shift rents to the employees. On 
the other hand, they can also improve the efficiency of the establishment through productive 
information exchange, consultation, and codetermination. A canonical reference for the 
theoretical discussion of these issues is the Freeman and Lazear (1995) model that extends the 
well-known workplace union collective voice arguments of Freeman and Medoff (1984) to 
the specific case of works councils. 
It follows that establishing the direction and extent of works councils’ net impact on 
economic performance is an empirical question. The econometric literature on German works 
councils is a work in progress, so that there is ongoing debate as to the consequences of the 
institution (for a comprehensive survey, see Addison, Schnabel and Wagner 2004). One 
problem that has not yet been dealt with in a convincing way is unobserved heterogeneity: 
plant diversity that is not reflected in the control variables used in the economists’ models 
employed for investigating the cet. par. relationship between works council presence and the 
relevant performance indicator.  
2 
To fix ideas, and to set the scene for the present inquiry, consider a core dimension of 
plant performance that has been analyzed in the empirical literature on works councils: 
establishment labor productivity, as measured by average value added per employee. A 
standard approach has been to estimate a single-equation model with productivity as the 
dependent variable and a set of factors that are related to productivity (e.g., percentage of 
skilled employees, hours worked per week, etc.) plus a dummy variable indicating the 
presence or otherwise of a works council as independent variables. Consider now the role of a 
variable that is not included in the set of determinants of productivity in the empirical model, 
namely, management competence. This omitted variable can be expected to have an impact 
on all dimensions of plant performance, including labor productivity. Highly-able managers 
will organize the production process in such a way that leads to rather high values of labor 
productivity for a given set of establishment characteristics, and conversely in the case of bad 
managers. In short, conditional on the productivity-determining characteristics of an 
establishment included in the empirical model, there will be over achievers (with able 
managers) and under performers (with incompetent managers).
1 
The competence of company or plant management is a variable for which no measure 
(or proxy) is readily available from the surveys used to investigate the works council-labor 
productivity nexus, and unmeasured management competence leads to unobserved 
establishment heterogeneity. The standard tools used in econometrics to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity cannot be used in this context for two reasons: First, the extant 
longitudinal data sets include only a small number of establishments that introduce or 
abandon works councils (see Addison, Bellmann, Schnabel, and Wagner 2004), meaning that 
estimated coefficients from fixed effects models may be unreliable. Second, unobserved 
management quality and some of the determinants of labor productivity included in the 
                                                            
1 The terms over achievers and under performers are borrowed from a study on cross-country differences in 
economic growth by Barreto and Hughes (2004) that also uses quantile regression methods.  
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empirical model tend to be correlated, so that coefficient estimates from random effects 
models are biased. 
Further, unmeasured management competence is not the only source of unobserved 
establishment heterogeneity. There are other variables that are relevant for productivity for 
which no information is available in survey data; the principal case in point for the data sets 
used here is the value of the capital stock, information on which could not be collected in 
interviews with the owner or manager. 
Acknowledging that establishments are heterogeneous in the sense discussed above, we 
have good reason to suspect that the effects of the variables included in an empirical model to 
explain labor productivity need not be the same for all firms. Consider the way managers and 
works councils interact. In Germany, works councils are sometimes regarded as factors of 
production or as ‘co-managers.’ It may well be the case that highly competent managers will 
cooperate with a works council in a way that materially enhances productivity; managers who 
are incompetent or who oppose works councils in principle will fail here, too.
2 In these 
circumstances, a positive impact of works councils will be found in over-achieving 
establishments (i.e., in plants that, conditional on their observed characteristics, have a rather 
high labor productivity), while either no effect or a negative effect will be present in under-
performing establishments. 
If we are interested in the relationship between labor productivity on the one hand and a 
set of plant characteristics (such as works council presence, establishment size, skill intensity, 
etc.) on the other, and if we regress labor productivity on these independent variables using 
ordinary least squares (OLS), there is no room for plant heterogeneity of the kind discussed 
here. OLS assumes that the conditional distribution of labor productivity, given the set of 
plant characteristics, is homogeneous. This implies that, no matter what point on the 
                                                            
2 Note that in their classic analysis of union efficiency effects, Freeman and Medoff (1984) not only stress the 
beneficial effects of collective voice, but also point to the importance of management response.  
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conditional distribution is analyzed, the estimates of the relationship between labor 
productivity (the dependent variable) and the plant characteristics (the independent variables) 
are the same. If one wants to test the empirical validity of this rather restrictive assumption, 
and if one is interested in the evaluation of the relative importance of the variables viewed as 
determining labor productivity at different points of the conditional distribution of labor 
productivity, one has to apply a different estimation technique that is tailor-made for this: 
quantile regression. 
A discussion of the technical details of quantile regression is beyond the scope of this 
paper. The basic references are the comprehensive treatise by Koenker (2005), the pioneering 
study by Koenker and Bassett (1978), and the survey by Buchinsky (1998); while Koenker 
and Hallock (2001) provide a useful non-technical introduction. Suffice it to say here that, in 
contrast to OLS (that gives information about the effects of the regressors at the conditional 
mean of the dependent variable only), quantile regression can provide parameter estimates at 
different quantiles of the conditional distribution of productivity. The estimated regression 
coefficients can be interpreted as the partial derivative of the conditional quantile of the 
dependent variable (here, labor productivity in a plant) with respect to a particular regressor 
(e.g., the presence or otherwise of a works council), namely, the marginal change in labor 
productivity at the k
th conditional quantile due to a change in the works council status of the 
plant. For each quantile it can be shown whether the effect of a particular regressor is positive 
or negative, and how large this effect is compared to other quantiles. This method provides 
information about the heterogeneity of plants. Note that quantile regression is not the same as 
applying OLS to subsets of the data produced by dividing the complete data set into different 
percentiles of the dependent variable. This would mean that not all of the data are being used 
for each estimate, and it would introduce the familiar type of sample selection bias. In 
contrast, for each quantile regression estimate all of the data are being used, although some 
observations do get more weight than others.  
5 
This paper contributes to the literature on works councils’ effects by for the first time 
applying quantile regression methods to the study of the relationship between labor 
productivity and works council presence.
3 Our discussion is organized as follows. Section 2 
gives information on the plant-level data sets and the empirical models used. Section 3 reports 
and comments on the findings from the econometric investigation. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Empirical Models 
Following Hamermesh’s (2000, p. 376) dictum that “the credibility of a new finding that is 
based on carefully analyzing two data sets is far more than twice that of a result based only on 
one”, our empirical investigation will use two plant level data sets. The first data set was 
collected in personal interviews conducted as part of a panel study, Das Hannoveraner 
Firmenpanel, investigating various aspects of firm behavior and firm performance. The 
population covered encompasses all manufacturing establishments with at least five 
employees in the state of Lower Saxony. We use the first (and largest) wave of this panel 
containing data for 1994. The interviews were conducted with the owner or top manager of 
the firm. Details of the Hannover Firm Panel data and how it can be accessed by researchers 
is given in Gerlach, Hübler, and Meyer (2003). 
The second data set we employ is the IAB Establishment Panel of the Institute for 
Employment Research of the Federal Labor Agency. Each year since 1993 (1996), this panel 
has surveyed several thousand establishments (with at least one employee covered by social 
insurance) from all sectors of the economy in western (eastern Germany). We make use of the 
wave in 2000 since in this year the sample was substantially increased and information on the 
existence of works councils and profit sharing schemes was obtained. The data are again 
                                                            
3 Although they have not been deployed previously in the works council literature, quantile regressions have 
been used in a number of firm productivity studies. Examples include analyses of the productivity effects of 
foreign ownership in Greece (Dimelis and Louri, 2002), of exporting in Turkey (Yasar, Nelson, and Rejesus, 
2003), and of teleworking in Denmark (Kaiser, 2004).  
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collected in personal interviews with the owners or top managers of the plant. Since the panel 
is created to serve the needs of the Federal Labor Agency, its focus is on employment-related 
matters, including establishment performance. Kölling (2000) provides a detailed description 
of the IAB Establishment Panel. 
The empirical model used here to investigate the relationship between labor 
productivity and the presence or not of a works council is an augmented version of that used 
in an earlier contribution by (three of) the present authors that investigated the effects of 
works councils on various aspects of establishment performance (see Addison, Schnabel, and 
Wagner 2001). Details of the model specification slightly differ for the two data sets due to 
data availability. 
Using data from the Hannover Firm Panel study the dependent variable is labor 
productivity, proxied by value added per employee. As independent variables, and in addition 
to a dummy variable for works council presence, we include establishment size (number of 
employees) and its square, as well as the status of the establishment as a branch plant to pick 
up possible internal and external factors conveying organizational and scale advantages. The 
productivity effects of human capital are captured by three variables describing the 
employment structure: the shares of females, skilled blue-collar workers, and academically-
trained workers in employment. Another regressor, the proportion of part timers, is 
mechanically linked to value-added per head. For its part, the modernity of the physical 
capital stock is expected to lead to higher productivity, and the same holds for higher capacity 
utilization, a longer work week, the presence of shift working, and enhanced market share 
(i.e., price setting power). Dummy variables for the presence or otherwise of profit sharing 
schemes for both workers and managers are included to model any tendency they might have 
to stimulate higher productivity. Following Jirjahn (2003), the empirical model furthermore 
includes an interaction term of the two dummy variables indicating the presence or otherwise 
of a works council and profit sharing for managers. Jirjahn (2003) finds that works councils  
7 
seem to be of particular importance for the economic success of establishments when no 
managerial profit sharing is in place. Finally, we control for the age of the establishment and 
for industry affiliation. 
The empirical model fitted to the IAB Establishment Panel data follows the above 
specification as closely as possible. As before, the dependent variable is value added per 
employee. We include the following regressors: a dummy for works council presence, the 
number of employees and its square, a dummy variable indicating that the establishment is a 
branch plant, the shares of female employees, skilled and part-time workers, the modernity of 
the capital stock, normally worked hours per week, a dummy variable for employee profit 
sharing, the age of the establishment and industry dummies. Each of these variables is also 
included in the specification based on the Hannover Firm Panel. Unfortunately, unlike the 
Hannover Firm Panel, the IAB Establishment Panel does not provide information on profit 
sharing for managers, so that this variable and its interaction with works council presence 
cannot be included. In addition, we could not use variables on shift work, capacity utilization 
and the market share. 
In an important recent contribution to the debate on works councils’ impact on firm 
performance, Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) use a bargaining model to derive the hypothesis that, 
in establishments covered by collective bargaining agreements, works councils are more 
likely to be constrained in their rent-seeking activities than their counterparts in uncovered 
establishments and hence more likely to focus on production issues. Their empirical analysis 
confirms this hypothesis: the presence of works councils exerts a positive impact on 
productivity within the covered industrial relations regime but not within the uncovered 
regime. To investigate the validity of this hypothesis in an empirical approach that uses 
quantile regression to take care of plant heterogeneity, we shall split our sample into two 
subsamples for establishments covered by collective bargaining or otherwise, and investigate 
both subsamples separately.  
8 
Furthermore, while the Hannover Firm Panel only includes plants from manufacturing 
industries in a single Land (of western Germany), the IAB Establishment Panel covers 
Germany as a whole, and it includes plants from all industries. Therefore, in our empirical 
investigation using this latter data set we separately look at plants from four groups: 
manufacturing industries and services in western and eastern Germany. This allows us, on the 
one hand, to replicate the results from the Hannover Firm Panel by analyzing the sub-sample 
of manufacturing plants in western Germany in the IAB Establishment Panel, while also 
taking a broader perspective on the other. 
Given that the survey data sets used here do not have information on either the physical 
capital stock of the establishment or the physical output produced, our findings must 
necessarily be viewed with some caution. Nevertheless, the data are rich enough to help us to 
learn more about the variation of the productivity-works council relationship along the 




In the first step of our econometric investigation, the empirical model is estimated by OLS 
using data for manufacturing plants from Lower Saxony (taken from the Hannover Firm 
Panel) and for manufacturing plants from western Germany (taken from the IAB 
Establishment Panel). Given our focus on the relationship between productivity and works 
councils, we only present the estimated coefficients of the works council dummy in Table 1, 
and do not comment on the results for the other variables included in our empirical models. 
                                                            
4 Over-achieving plants may be expected to have a higher physical capital stock, but there is no reason to believe 
that the impact of a works council on productivity varies with the capital stock.  
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The full estimation results for plants covered/not covered by collective bargaining can be 
found in Tables 1 through 4 in the Appendix.
5  
As can be seen from the first panel and the first column of Table 1, for both data sets 
used the coefficient estimate of the works council dummy variable is positive and statistically 
significant (at an error level of less than one percent) for plants that are covered by collective 
bargaining only, while it is insignificant for the sub-samples of uncovered plants. This result 
is in line with the hypothesis and the findings of Hübler and Jirjahn (2003). Furthermore, the 
point estimate reported for manufacturing plants that are covered by collective bargaining 
indicates that value added per employee is some 26,000 DM (or about € 13,000) higher in 
establishments with a works council compared to those without when data from the Hannover 
Firm Panel are used. The corresponding point estimates from the IAB Establishment Panel are 
even higher (nearly 60,000 DM). These values are of course quite large from an economic 
point of view. 
[Table 1 near here] 
To repeat, application of OLS implies that, no matter what point on the conditional 
distribution is analyzed, the estimate of the relationship between labor productivity and the 
plant characteristics is the same. To test the empirical validity of this rather restrictive 
assumption, and to uncover the relative importance of the variables viewed as determining 
labor productivity at different points of the conditional distribution of value added per 
employee, quantile regression estimation is next applied. In this second step, we examine five 
points in the distribution, namely, at the 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 0.90 quantiles. Detailed 
results are again consigned to the Appendix tables. 
The quantile regression coefficient estimates for the works council dummy variable in 
Table 1 confirm the insight of the OLS estimates that works councils do not play a significant 
                                                            
5 All computations were done using Stata/SE 8.2. To facilitate replication and extensions the do-files for 
estimations using the the Hannover Firm Panel data and the IAB Establishment Panel data are available from the  
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role for labor productivity in plants not covered by collective bargaining, irrespective of the 
data set used. For plants covered by collective bargaining, however, the point estimates and 
the statistical significance of the coefficient estimates for the works council dummy variable 
differ widely across the regressions for the various quantiles, and vis-à-vis the benchmark 
results from the OLS regression. 
Looking first at manufacturing plants from Lower Saxony, for the sub-sample of plants 
covered by collective bargaining the works council coefficients are positive but much smaller 
than in the OLS regression for all but the highest quantile investigated. Moreover, only for 
establishments at the very top of the conditional distribution of productivity is the works 
council coefficient estimate statistically significant at an error level of five percent or better. 
The null hypotheses that the coefficients of the works council dummy variable are equal 
between pairs of quantiles and across all quantiles may be tested using the variance-
covariance matrix of the coefficients of the system of quantile regressions. As can be seen 
from Table 2 the null hypothesis is rejected at an error level of 3 percent or smaller for the 
0.90 quantile vs. all other quantiles in pairwise tests, and at the same error level in a joint test 
for all quantiles. 
[Table 2 near here] 
Although this result seems to support the notion of special productivity-enhancing 
effects of works councils in over-achieving plants, it cannot be replicated for the larger 
sample of manufacturing plants from all states in western Germany. That is, using the IAB 
data, the coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the five percent level in the 0.25, 
0.50 and 0.75 quantiles but not in the 0.10 and 0.90 quantiles. The null hypothesis of equal 
coefficients between pairs of quantiles and across all quantiles cannot be rejected at the five 
percent level for all tests other than the 0.10 vs. the 0.50 quantile. While we cannot rule out 
the possibility that the slightly different specifications of the empirical models used and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
first and the second author, respectively, on request.  
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different years analyzed play a role, these substantially different results illustrate that it is 
important not to base conclusions on results from a single data set.
6 
Similar reasoning suggests the need to extend the investigation of productivity effects 
beyond the boundary of western German manufacturing industry, the focus of most industrial 
relations research. In particular, it should be interesting to determine whether works councils 
have similar productivity effects in eastern Germany (which has a completely different history 
of industrial relations and has adopted works only in the wake of unification) and in the 
private service sector. 
Results of using OLS and quantile regression to estimate the empirical model for 
manufacturing plants in eastern Germany are reported in the second panel of Table 1. In line 
with the results for manufacturing firms in western Germany, both the OLS and quantile 
regression estimates fail to indicate works council pro-productivity effects in plants not 
covered by collective bargaining. For firms covered by collective bargaining the effect of a 
works council on productivity is positive and statistically significant at the five percent level 
in the OLS estimation and in the regressions for the 0.10, 0.25 and 0.50 quantiles (but not for 
the 0.90 quantile of over achievers) in 2000. However, the null hypothesis that the coefficients 
of the works council dummy variable are equal between pairs of quantiles and across all 
quantiles cannot be rejected at a conventional level (see Table 2). Furthermore, when the OLS 
and quantile regressions are repeated for the year 2001, the results for the works council 
coefficient (which are not reported here but available on request) are almost always 
statistically insignificant, raising some doubt as to the robustness of the “works councils raise 
productivity” result in eastern Germany even for plants covered by collective bargaining. 
                                                            
6 As a case in point, in the earlier version of the present paper (Wagner, Addison, Schnabel, and Schank, 2004) 
we argued on the basis of results for manufacturing plants in Lower Saxony alone that quantile regressions point 
to a positive impact of works councils only in over-achieving establishments (i.e., in plants that, conditional on 
their observed characteristics, have a very high labor productivity), with no statistically significant effect being 
recorded for the rest of the plants. We argued that our central finding of a positive impact of works councils in 
these over-achieving establishments alone might be due to the fact that only highly competent managers of over-
achieving establishments tend to cooperate with a works council in a way that materially enhances productivity. 
Obviously, this conclusion is no longer valid given the results of estimations with the IAB panel data.  
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In the last step of our investigation, we look beyond manufacturing to the services 
sector, again considering plants from both parts of Germany. Results are reported in the lower 
panel of Table 1. Starting with plants not covered by collective bargaining, OLS and quantile 
regressions do not show any statistically significant effects of works councils on labor 
productivity at the five percent level, with the sole exception of the 0.10 quantile in eastern 
Germany. These results are broadly in line with our findings for manufacturing 
establishments. Contrary to the results for manufacturing, however, nor do works councils 
have an impact on labor productivity in service sector plants that are covered by collective 
bargaining. In other words, the Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) story does not seem to hold for 
services. This again underscores the insight that the impressive results from the Hannover 
Firm Panel cannot be readily generalized. 
To sum up, we find that the estimated impact of works councils on labor productivity 
varies between manufacturing and services, between eastern and western Germany, between 
plants that are or are not covered by collective bargaining, and along the conditional 
distribution of labor productivity. One of the few findings that is robust across data sets and 
estimation methods is that works councils in plants that are not covered by collective 
bargaining never have significantly higher labor productivity. The same applies for 
establishments and works councils in the service sector, be they covered by collective 
bargaining or not. For covered plants in manufacturing the estimated coefficients of the works 
council dummy variable are positive and statistically significant at the mean of the conditional 
distribution of labor productivity (i.e. when looking at results from OLS regressions), but not 
for all quantiles along this distribution. The different impact of works council presence on 
labor productivity in plants from different quantiles of the conditional productivity 
distribution points to unobserved firm heterogeneity as an important factor influencing the 
way works councils act and interact with management. The picture that emerges from our 
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different subsamples and data sets is, however, far from clear enough to allow informed 
speculation on what might be going on here. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Using OLS and quantile regression methods and rich cross-section data sets for 
manufacturing and services plants from western and eastern Germany, this paper has 
demonstrated that the impact of works council presence on labor productivity varies between 
manufacturing and services, between plants that are or are not covered by collective 
bargaining, and along the conditional distribution of labor productivity. No productivity 
effects of works councils were found in the service sector and in manufacturing plants that are 
not covered by collective bargaining. While there is some evidence for pro-productivity 
effects of works council presence in manufacturing plants covered by collective bargaining, 
their magnitude and statistical significance differs widely and unsystematically along the 
conditional productivity distribution and between different sets of data. 
Besides demonstrating that it is important to look at evidence based on more than one 
data set, our empirical findings point to the need to supplement OLS (or any other 
econometric method that focuses on the conditional mean of a dependent variable) estimation 
with quantile regression when investigating the behavior of heterogeneous plants. To put it 
differently, and to quote Buchinsky (1994, p. 453): “‘On the average’ has never been a 
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Table 1: Estimation Results for the Coefficient of the Works Council Dummy 
Quantile regression estimates  Sample OLS 
estimates  0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
Manufacturing plants         
Lower Saxony, covered 
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Western Germany, not 





























Eastern Germany, not 














Services plants         
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Notes: Prob-values reported in parentheses. The prob-values for quantile regressions are based 








Table 2: Tests on the Equality of Works Council Dummy Coefficients 
(Establishments Covered by Collective Bargaining Only) 














0.10 vs. 0.25 
0.10 vs. 0.50 
0.10 vs. 0.75 


























0.25 vs. 0.50 
0.25 vs. 0.75 
















0.50 vs. 0.75 











0.75 vs. 0.90  0.03  0.88  0.47  0.87  0.84 
Joint test for all 
quantiles 
0.03 0.19 0.57 0.73  0.91 
Note: The null hypothesis is that the coefficients are equal between pairs of quantiles and 
across all quantiles. Test statistics are based on the variance-covariance matrix of the 
coefficients of the system of quantile regressions reported in Table 1. Table 2 reports the 
prob-values for the F-values; if the prob-value is less than the level of significance, the null 





Appendix 1: Labor Productivity Estimations, Lower Saxony 
(Dependent Variable: Log Value Added per Employee in Lower Saxony, Manufacturing Establishments Covered by Collective Bargaining)                         
   OLS  Quantile Regression  
Variable    0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
Works council 
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Market share for most important product line in most 



























Number of observations  458  458  458  458  458  458 
R
2  0.349       
Pseudo R
2    0.239 0.227 0.243 0.300 0.362 
  Notes:  (1) Prob-values reported in parenthesis; the prob-values for quantile regressions are based on standard errors bootstrapped    
                   with 100 replications. 




Appendix 2: Labor Productivity Estimations, Lower Saxony 
(Dependent Variable: Log Value Added per Employee in Lower Saxony, Manufacturing Establishments Not Covered by Collective Bargaining) 
   OLS  Quantile Regression  
Variable    0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
Works council 
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Advanced production technology  
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Profit sharing for management 













Works council * profit sharing for management 













Market share for most important product line in most 



























Number  of  observations  231 231 231 231 231 231 
R
2  0.307       
Pseudo R
2    0.195 0.168 0.188 0.273 0.310 





Appendix 3: Labor Productivity Estimations, Western Germany 
(Dependent Variable: Log Value Added per Employee in Western Germany, Manufacturing Establishments Covered by Collective Bargaining) 
                             OLS  QuantileRegression   
Variable    0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
Works council 
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Number  of  observations  880 880 880 880 880 880 
R
2  .087       
Pseudo R
2    0.131 0.116 0.115 0.114 0.156 
Notes:  (1) See Appendix 1, Note (1) 
            (2) All regressions include dummy variables for 15 manufacturing industries.  
23 
Appendix 4: Labor Productivity Estimations, Western Germany 
(Dependent Variable: Log Value Added per Employee in West Germany, Manufacturing Establishments Not Covered by Collective Bargaining)                          
   OLS  Quantile Regression  
Variable    0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
Works council 
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Number  of  observations  360 360 360 360 360 360 
R
2  0.158       
Pseudo R
2    0.133 0.111 0.115 0.113 0.164 
Notes:  (1) See Appendix 1, footnote (1) and Appendix 3, footnote (2). 
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